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John McCarthy’s situation calculus has left an enduring mark on artiﬁcial intelligence
research. This simple yet elegant formalism for modelling and reasoning about dynamic
systems is still in common use more than forty years since it was ﬁrst proposed. The ability
to reason about action and change has long been considered a necessary component for
any intelligent system. The situation calculus and its numerous extensions as well as the
many competing proposals that it has inspired deal with this problem to some extent. In
this paper, we offer a new approach to belief change associated with performing actions
that addresses some of the shortcomings of these approaches. In particular, our approach is
based on a well-developed theory of action in the situation calculus extended to deal with
belief. Moreover, by augmenting this approach with a notion of plausibility over situations,
our account handles nested belief, belief introspection, mistaken belief, and handles belief
revision and belief update together with iterated belief change.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
The work of John McCarthy has had a profound and lasting effect on artiﬁcial intelligence research. One of his more
enduring contributions has been the introduction of the situation calculus [2,3]. This simple yet elegant formalism for mod-
elling and reasoning about dynamic systems is still in common use more than forty years since it was ﬁrst proposed. The
ability to reason about action and change has long been considered a necessary component for any intelligent system. An
agent acting in its environment must be capable of reasoning about the state of its environment and keeping track of any
changes to the environment as actions are performed. Various theories have been developed to give an account of how
this can be achieved. Foremost among these are theories of belief change and theories for reasoning about action. While
originating from different motivations, the two are united in their aim to have agents maintain a model of the environment
that matches the actual environment as closely as possible given the available information. An important consideration is
the ability to deal with a succession of changes; known as the problem of iterated belief change.
In this paper, we consider a new approach for modelling iterated belief change using the language of the situation
calculus [2,3]. While our approach is in some ways limited in its applicability, we feel that it is conceptually very simple
and offers a number of useful features not found in other approaches:
• It is completely integrated with a well-developed theory of action in the situation calculus [4] and its extension to
handle knowledge expansion [5,6]. Speciﬁcally, the manner in which beliefs change in our account is simply a special
✩ An earlier version of this paper appeared in Shapiro et al. (2000) [1].
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frame problem.
• Like Scherl and Levesque [5,6], our theory accommodates both belief update and belief expansion. The former concerns
beliefs that change as the result of the realization that the world has changed; the latter concerns beliefs that change
as the result of newly acquired information.
• Unlike Scherl and Levesque, however, our theory is not limited to belief expansion; rather it deals with the more general
case of belief revision. It will be possible in our model for an agent to believe some formula φ, acquire information that
causes it to change its mind and believe ¬φ (without believing the world has changed), and later go back to believing φ
again. In Scherl and Levesque and in other approaches based on this work such as [7,8], new information that contradicts
previous beliefs cannot be consistently accommodated.
• Because belief change in our model is always the result of action, our account naturally supports iterated belief change.
This is simply the result of a sequence of actions. Moreover, each individual action can potentially cause both an update
(by changing the world) and a revision (by providing sensing information) in a seamless way.
• Like Scherl and Levesque and unlike many previous approaches to belief change, e.g., [9,10], our approach supports
belief introspection: an agent will know what it believes and does not believe. Furthermore, it has information about
the past, and so will also know what it used to believe and not believe. Finally, an agent will be able to predict what it
will believe in the future after it acquires information through sensing.
• Unlike Scherl and Levesque, our agents will be able to introspectively tell the difference between an update and a
revision as they move from believing φ to believing ¬φ. In the former case, the agent will believe that it believed φ in
the past, and that it was correct to do so; in the latter case, it will believe that it believed φ in the past but that it was
mistaken.
• One important lesson learned is that not only does our method for iterated belief change in the situation calculus
possess interesting properties but attempting to use more sophisticated schemes that involve modifying plausibilities of
possible worlds, leads to unintuitive introspection properties when applied to situations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we brieﬂy review the situation calculus including the
Scherl and Levesque [5,6] model of belief expansion, and we review the most popular accounts of belief revision, belief
update, and iterated belief change; in Section 3, we motivate and deﬁne a new belief operator as a modiﬁcation to the one
used by Scherl and Levesque; in Section 4, we prove some properties of this operator, justifying the points made above;
in Section 5, we show the operator in action on a simple example, and how an agent can change its mind repeatedly;
in Section 6, we analyze the extent to which our framework satisﬁes revision, update, and iterated revision postulates; in
Section 7, we compare our framework to some of the existing approaches to belief change; and in the ﬁnal section, we draw
some conclusions and discuss future work.
1. Background
The basis of our framework for belief change is an action theory [4] based on the situation calculus [2,3], and extended
to include a belief operator [5,6]. In this section, we begin with a brief overview of the situation calculus and follow it with
a short review of belief change in suﬃcient detail to understand the contributions made in this paper.
1.1. The situation calculus
The situation calculus is a predicate calculus language for representing dynamically changing domains. A situation repre-
sents a snapshot of the domain. There is a set of initial situations corresponding to the ways the agent1 believes the domain
might be initially. The actual initial state of the domain is represented by the distinguished initial situation constant, S0,
which may or may not be among the set of initial situations believed possible by the agent. The term do(a, s) denotes the
unique situation that results from the agent performing action a in situation s. Thus, the situations can be structured into a
set of trees, where the root of each tree is an initial situation and the arcs are actions.
Predicates and functions whose value may change from situation to situation (and whose last argument is a situation)
are called ﬂuents. For instance, we use the ﬂuent InR1(s) to represent that the agent is in room R1 in situation s. The effects
of actions on ﬂuents are deﬁned using successor state axioms [4], which provide a succinct representation for both effect
axioms and frame axioms [2,3]. For example, assume that there are only two rooms, R1 and R2, and that the action leave
takes the agent from the current room to the other room. Then, the successor state axiom for InR1 is2:
InR1
(
do(a, s)
)≡ ((¬InR1(s) ∧ a = leave
)∨ (InR1(s) ∧ a = leave
))
.
This axiom asserts that the agent will be in R1 after doing some action if and only if either the agent is in R2 (¬InR1(s))
and leaves it or the agent is currently in R1 and the action is anything other than leaving it.
1 The situation calculus can accommodate multiple agents, but for the purposes of this paper we assume that there is a single agent, and all actions are
performed by that agent.
2 We adopt the convention that unbound variables are universally quantiﬁed in the widest scope.
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situations as possible worlds. Scherl and Levesque [5,6] adapted the semantics to the action theories of Reiter [4]. The idea
is to have an accessibility relation on situations, B(s′, s), which holds if in situation s, the situation s′ is considered possible
by the agent. Note that the order of the arguments is reversed from the usual convention in modal logic.
Levesque [8] introduced a predicate, SF(a, s), to describe the result of performing the binary-valued sensing action a.
SF(a, s) holds if and only if the sensor associated with a returns the sensing value 1 in situation s. Each sensing action
senses some property of the domain. The property sensed by an action is associated with the action using a guarded sensed
ﬂuent axiom [12]. For example, suppose that there are lights in R1 and R2 and that Light1(s) (Light2(s), respectively) holds
if the light in R1 (R2, respectively) is on. Then:
InR1(s) ⊃
(
SF(senseLight, s) ≡ Light1(s)
)
¬InR1(s) ⊃
(
SF(senseLight, s) ≡ Light2(s)
)
can be used to specify that the senseLight action senses whether the light is on in the room where the agent is currently
located.
Scherl and Levesque [5,6] deﬁned a successor state axiom for B that shows how actions, including sensing actions, affect
the beliefs of the agent. We use the same axiom (with some notational variation) here:
Axiom 1 (Successor state axiom for B).
B
(
s′′,do(a, s)
)≡ ∃s′[B(s′, s)∧ s′′ = do(a, s′)∧ (SF(a, s′)≡ SF(a, s))].
The situations s′′ that are B-related to do(a, s) are the ones that result from doing action a in a situation s′ , such that
the sensor associated with action a has the same value in s′ as it does in s. This axiom is further illustrated in Fig. 2 and
the explanatory text that follows. We will see in Section 2.2 how a belief operator can be deﬁned in terms of this ﬂuent.
There are various ways of axiomatizing dynamic applications in the situation calculus. Here we adopt a simple form
of the guarded action theories described by De Giacomo and Levesque [12] consisting of: (1) successor state axioms3 for
each ﬂuent (including B and pl introduced below), and guarded sensed ﬂuent axioms for each action, as discussed above;
(2) unique names axioms for the actions, and domain-independent foundational axioms (given below); and (3) initial state
axioms, which describe the initial state of the domain and the initial beliefs of the agent.4 For simplicity, we assume here
that all actions are always executable and omit the action precondition axioms and references to a Poss predicate that are
normally included in situation calculus action theories. These do not add any signiﬁcant complexity to our approach but
omitting them here allows us to focus on the key elements of our framework.
In what follows, we will use Σ to refer to a guarded action theory of this form. By a domain-dependent ﬂuent, we mean
a ﬂuent other than B or pl, and a domain-dependent formula is one that only mentions domain-dependent ﬂuents.
As part of every guarded action theory, we have unique names axioms for actions and foundational axioms. The unique
names axioms for the actions state that distinct action function symbols correspond to different action functions. For every
pair of distinct action functions, a1 and a2, we need an axiom of the following form:
Axiom 2.
a1(
x) = a2(
y).
Also, for an action function, a, we need an axiom of the following form:
Axiom 3.
a(
x) = a(
y) ⊃ 
x= 
y.
This means that an action function applied to distinct arguments is mapped to different actions, i.e., all action functions
are injective. If we have n action functions, we need O (n2) unique names axioms [13]. However, it would not be diﬃcult to
have them automatically generated from a list of the action names and arities.
We want the situations to be the smallest set generated by sequences of actions starting in an initial situation. We
axiomatize the structure of the situations with foundational axioms based on the ones listed in Levesque et al. [14] and Pirri
3 We could use the more general guarded successor state axioms of De Giacomo and Levesque [12], but regular successor state axioms suﬃce for the
simple domain we consider here and for illustrating our approach.
4 These are axioms that only describe initial situations. Reiter [4] has adopted S0 as the only initial situation, but to formalize belief, we need additional
initial situations representing the alternative scenarios consistent with the agent’s initial beliefs.
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have no predecessors:
Init
(
s′
) def= ¬∃a, s.s′ = do(a, s).
We declare S0 to be an initial situation.
Axiom 4.
Init(S0).
We also need an axiom stating that do is injective.
Axiom 5.
do(a1, s1) = do(a2, s2) ⊃ (a1 = a2 ∧ s1 = s2).
The induction axiom for situations says that if a property P holds of all initial situations, and P holds for all successors
of situation s if it holds for s, then P holds for all situations.
Axiom 6.
∀P .[(∀s.Init(s) ⊃ P (s))∧ (∀a, s.P (s) ⊃ P(do(a, s)))]⊃ ∀sP (s).
We now deﬁne precedence for situations. We say that s strictly precedes s′ if and only if there is a (non-empty) sequence
of actions that take s to s′ .
Axiom 7.
∀s1, s2.s1 ≺ s2 ≡
(∃a, s.s2 = do(a, s) ∧ (s1  s)
)
,
where s1  s2 def= s1 = s2 ∨ s1 ≺ s2 denotes that s1 precedes s2.
1.2. Belief change
Before formally deﬁning a belief operator in this language, we brieﬂy review the notion of belief change as it exists in the
literature. Belief change, simply put, aims to study the manner in which an agent’s epistemic (belief) state should change
when the agent is confronted by new information. In the literature,5 there is often a clear distinction between two forms
of belief change: revision and update. Both forms can be characterized by an axiomatic approach (in terms of rationality
postulates) or through various constructions (e.g., epistemic entrenchment, possible worlds, etc.). The AGM theory [9] is the
prototypical example of belief revision while the KM framework [10] is often identiﬁed with belief update.
Intuitively speaking, belief revision is appropriate for modelling static environments about which the agent has only
partial and possibly incorrect information. New information is used to ﬁll in gaps and correct errors, but the environment
itself does not undergo change. Belief update, on the other hand, is intended for situations in which the environment itself
is changing due to the performing of actions.
For completeness and later comparison, we list here the AGM postulates [16,9] for belief revision. By K ∗φ we mean the
revision of belief state K by new information φ.6
(K∗1) K ∗ φ is deductively closed
(K∗2) φ ∈ K ∗ φ
(K∗3) K ∗ φ ⊆ K + φ
(K∗4) If ¬φ /∈ K , then K + φ ⊆ K ∗ φ
(K∗5) K ∗ φ =L iff | ¬φ
(K∗6) If | φ ≡ ψ , then K ∗ φ = K ∗ ψ
(K∗7) K ∗ (φ ∧ ψ) ⊆ (K ∗ φ) + ψ
(K∗8) If ¬ψ /∈ K ∗ φ, then (K ∗ φ) + ψ ⊆ K ∗ (φ ∧ ψ)
5 We shall restrict our attention to approaches in the AGM vein [16,9,10] although there are many others.
6 In the AGM theory, K is a set of formulae and φ is a formula taken from an object language L containing the standard Boolean connectives and
the logical constant ⊥ (falsum). Furthermore, K is a set of formulae (from L) closed under the deductive consequence operator Cn associated with the
underlying logic. The operation K + φ denotes the belief expansion of K by φ and is deﬁned as K + φ = Cn(K ∪ {φ}). [K ] denotes the set of all consistent
complete theories of L containing K .
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state K by formula φ.7
(K  1) K  φ is deductively closed
(K  2) φ ∈ K  φ
(K  3) If φ ∈ K , then K  φ = K
(K  4) K  φ =L iff K | ⊥ or φ | ⊥
(K  5) If | φ ≡ ψ , then K  φ = K  ψ
(K  6) K  (φ ∧ ψ) ⊆ (K  φ) + ψ
(K  7) If K is complete and ¬ψ /∈ K  φ, then (K  φ) + ψ ⊆ K  (φ ∧ ψ)
(K  8) If [K ] = ∅, then K  φ =⋂w∈[K ] w  φ
One of the major issues in this area is that of iterated belief change, i.e., modelling how the agent’s beliefs change after
a succession of belief revisions or updates occur. Two of the main developments in this area are the work of Darwiche
and Pearl [18] and Boutilier [19]. Darwiche and Pearl put forward the following postulates as a way of extending the AGM
revision postulates to handle iterated revision.8
(DP1) If ψ | φ, then (K ∗ φ) ∗ ψ = K ∗ ψ
(DP2) If ψ | ¬φ, then (K ∗ φ) ∗ ψ = K ∗ ψ
(DP3) If φ ∈ K ∗ ψ , then φ ∈ (K ∗ φ) ∗ ψ
(DP4) If ¬φ /∈ K ∗ ψ , then ¬φ /∈ (K ∗ φ) ∗ ψ
In Section 5, we return to consider the extent to which our framework satisﬁes these postulates.
2. Our account of belief change
2.1. Belief change and introspection
Scherl and Levesque provide an elegant framework for incorporating knowledge change into the situation calculus. How-
ever, in many applications, there is a need to represent information that could turn out to be wrong, i.e., we need to be
able to represent beliefs and how they change due to actions. In order to incorporate belief change into our framework,
we decided to adapt ideas from Spohn [20] and Darwiche and Pearl [18]. Our ﬁrst attempt was to add an extra argument
to the accessibility relation. This extra argument was a natural number corresponding to the plausibility of the accessible
situation.9 B(s′,n, s) would denote that in s, the agent thinks s′ was possible with κ-ranking (plausibility) n.10 The lower
κ-ranking, the more plausible the situation would be considered by the agent, and the beliefs of the agent in s would be
determined by the situations accessible from s with κ-ranking 0, i.e.,
Bel(φ, s)
def= ∀s′.B(s′,0, s)⊃ φ[s′].
The successor state axiom for B would adjust the plausibilities of the B-related situations depending on the results
of sensing using a scheme similar to Darwiche and Pearl’s. Unlike most other approaches to belief revision, we wanted
to handle positive and negative introspection of beliefs. However, we realized that this desideratum was in conﬂict with
any reasonable scheme for updating plausibilities of accessible situations. Any reasonable scheme would have the following
property: if the accessible situation agrees with the actual situation on the result of a sensing action, the plausibility of the situation
should increase (i.e., its κ-ranking should decrease), otherwise the plausibility should decrease. In other words, if B(s′,n, s) and
SF(a, s′) ≡ SF(a, s) hold, then B(do(a, s′),m,do(a, s)) should hold for some m  n. Similarly, if SF(a, s′) ≡ ¬SF(a, s) holds,
then m should be greater than or equal to n. On the other hand, to ensure positive and negative introspection of beliefs,
we combined and generalized the constraints that B be transitive and Euclidean to obtain the following requirement on B
(which we call (TE) for transitive and Euclidean):
∀s, s′.(∃n.B(s′,n, s))⊃ [∀s′′,m.B(s′′,m, s′)≡ B(s′′,m, s)]. (TE)
This requirement ensures that any situation s′ accessible from s has the same belief structure as s, i.e., s′ has the same
accessible situations with the same plausibilities as s. This ensures that the agent has positive and negative introspection of
7 To facilitate comparison with the AGM postulates, we have reformulated the original postulates of Katsuno and Mendelzon into an equivalent set using
AGM-style terminology [17]. For renderings of these postulates and the AGM postulates above in the KM-style, refer to Katsuno and Mendelzon [10].
8 Again, for consistency of presentation, we have translated the Darwiche and Pearl postulates into AGM-style terminology rather than KM-style termi-
nology used in the original paper.
9 In fact, the actual numbers assigned to the situations are not relevant. All that is important is the ordering of the situations by plausibility. We could
have used any total preorder on situations for this purpose, but using  on natural numbers simpliﬁes the presentation of our framework.
10 We adopt Spohn’s [20] terminology here.
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its entire epistemic state, i.e., both its beliefs and conditional beliefs. For example, in Fig. 3, all the situations within each
oval are mutually accessible (and only these situations are accessible) with the plausibility indicated inside the oval.
To see why this requirement conﬂicts with any reasonable plausibility update scheme for perfectly accurate sensors,
consider the following example illustrated in Fig. 1. In the ﬁgure, there are three situations, S , S1, and S2. S1 and S2 are
accessible from S , and S1 has κ-ranking n (the κ-ranking of S2 is irrelevant to the example). In order to satisfy (TE), S1
must also be accessible from S2 with κ-ranking n. However, after the agent senses φ (i.e., after it performs the action
senseφ ), S1 will have to become less plausible relative to S , but more plausible relative to S2, since S1 and S disagree on
the value of φ, whereas S1 and S2 agree. Therefore, (TE) will in general be violated after the agent senses φ.
A possible solution to this problem is to consider only what the agent believes in the actual situation, i.e., in S0 and its
successors, and set the plausibilities of all accessible situations according to whether they agree with the actual situation on
the value of the property being sensed. In our example, if we take S to be S0, S1 would then become less plausible relative
to both S and S2. Unfortunately, this solution can also lead to subtle undesirable introspective properties. For instance, in
Section 6 we show how one can construct an example where the following holds: Bel(¬φ ∧ Bel(φ,do(senseφ,now)), S), i.e.,
in S , the agent believes ¬φ, and also believes that after sensing φ, it will believe φ, which is counterintuitive. If the agent
believes ¬φ, then it should also believe that it will continue to believe ¬φ after sensing φ.
Our resolution to this problem, which is discussed at length in the following sections, was to revert back to a binary
accessibility relation and to use Scherl and Levesque’s successor state axiom for B . Instead of assigning plausibilities relative
to a situation, each situation is assigned an absolute plausibility using a functional ﬂuent pl(s), which maps a situation to
a natural number corresponding to the κ-ranking of s (again, the lower the κ-ranking, the more plausible the situation).
The plausibilities of successor situations are constrained to be the same as their predecessors, i.e., the plausibility of a
situation is unaffected by actions. The beliefs of the agent in a situation s are those formulae true in the most plausible
situations accessible from s, but these situations are no longer required to have κ-rank 0. When sensing occurs, accessible
situations will be dropped, therefore the set of the most plausible accessible situations will change, and the agent’s beliefs
will change. Since Scherl and Levesque’s successor state axiom for B preserves (TE), positive and negative introspection will
be maintained, if it holds initially.
2.2. Deﬁnition of the belief operator
In this section, we deﬁne what it means for an agent to believe a formula φ in a situation s, i.e., Bel(φ, s). Since φ will
usually contain ﬂuents, we introduce a special symbol now as a placeholder for the situation argument of these ﬂuents, e.g.,
Bel(InR1(now), s). φ[s] denotes the formula that results from substituting s for now in φ. To make the formulae easier to
read, we will often suppress the situation argument of ﬂuents in the scope of a belief operator, e.g., Bel(InR1, s).
Scherl and Levesque [5,6], deﬁne a modal operator for belief in terms of the accessibility relation on situations, B(s′, s).
For Scherl and Levesque, the believed formulae are the ones true in all accessible situations:
Deﬁnition 8.
BelSL(φ, s)
def= ∀s′(B(s′, s)⊃ φ[s′]).
To understand how belief change works, both in Scherl and Levesque and here, consider the example illustrated in Fig. 2.
In this example, we have three initial situations S, S1, and S2 (across the bottom of the diagram). S1 and S2 are B-related
to S (i.e., B(S1, S) and B(S2, S)), as indicated by the arrows labelled B . (Ignore the circles around certain situations for
now.) In all three situations, the agent is not in the room R1. In S and S2 the light in R1 is on, and in S1 the light is off. So
at S , the agent believes it is not in R1 (i.e., that it is in R2), but it has no beliefs about the status of the light in R1. We ﬁrst
consider the action of leaving R2, which will lead to a belief update. By the successor state axiom for B , both do(leave, S1)
and do(leave, S2) are B-related to do(leave, S). In the ﬁgure, these three situations are called S ′1, S ′2 and S ′ , respectively.
The successor state axiom for InR1 causes InR1 to hold in these situations. Therefore, the agent believes InR1 in S ′ . By the
successor state axiom for Light1, which we state below, the truth value of Light1 would not change as the result of leave.
This is an example of belief update: the agent’s beliefs are modiﬁed as a result of reasoning about actions performed in the
environment.
Now the agent performs the sensing action senseLight. According to the sensed ﬂuent axioms for senseLight,
SF(senseLight, S∗) holds for situation S∗ if and only if the light is on in the room in which the agent is located in S∗ .
In the ﬁgure, the light in R1 is on in S ′ and S ′2, but not in S ′1. So, SF holds for senseLight in the former two situations but
not in the latter. The successor state axiom for B ensures that after doing a sensing action A, any situation that disagrees
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with the actual situation on the value of SF for A is dropped from the B relation in the successor state. In the ﬁgure, S ′
is the actual situation. Since S ′1 disagrees with S ′ on the value of SF for senseLight, do(senseLight, S ′1) (labelled S ′′1 in
the ﬁgure) is not B-related to do(senseLight, S ′) (labelled S ′′). On the other hand, S ′2 and S ′ agree on the value of SF for
senseLight, so do(senseLight, S ′2) (labelled S ′′2 in the ﬁgure) is B-related to S ′′ . The result is that the agent believes the light
is on in S ′′ . This is an example of belief expansion because the belief that the light is on was simply added to the belief
state of the agent. Belief revision works using the same principles.
Our deﬁnition of Bel is similar to the one in Scherl and Levesque, but we are going to generalize their account in order
to be able to talk about how plausible the agent considers a situation to be. Plausibility is assigned to situations using a
function pl(s), whose range is the natural numbers, where lower values indicate higher plausibility. The pl function only has
to be speciﬁed over initial situations, using an initial state axiom. Successor situations have the same plausibility as their
predecessors, as stipulated by the following successor state axiom:
Axiom 9 (Successor state axiom for pl).
pl
(
do(a, s)
)= pl(s).
We say that the agent believes a proposition φ in situation s, if φ holds in the most plausible B-related situations.
A situation is most plausible in situation s, if it is at least as plausible as all alternate situations to s:
Deﬁnition 10.
MP
(
s′, s
) def= ∀s′′.B(s′′, s)⊃ pl(s′) pl(s′′).
We use MPB(s′, s) to denote the situations s′ that are most plausible and B-related to s:
Deﬁnition 11.
MPB
(
s′, s
) def= B(s′, s)∧MP(s′, s).
Finally, we deﬁne the belief operator as follows:
Deﬁnition 12.
Bel(φ, s)
def= ∀s′.MPB(s′, s)⊃ φ[s′].
That is, φ is believed at s when it holds at all the most plausible situations B-related to s. Note that unlike Spohn [20]
and Darwiche and Pearl [18], we do not require some situations to have plausibility 0.
We now return to the initial situations in Fig. 2, and add a plausibility structure to the belief state of the agent by
supposing that S1 is more plausible than S2 (indicated by the circle surrounding S1). For example, suppose that pl(S1) = 0
and pl(S2) = 1. Now, the beliefs of the agent are initially determined only by S1. Therefore, the agent now believes that
the light R1 is off in S . After leaving R2, the agent continues to believe that the light is off. After doing senseLight, S ′′ is1
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of the agent. Since the light is on in S ′′2, the agent believes it is on in S ′′ . Since the agent goes from believing the light is off
to believing it is on, this is a case of belief revision.
In order to ensure positive and negative introspection of beliefs, we assert the (TE) constraint over initial situations using
an initial state axiom:
Axiom 13.
Init(s) ∧ B(s′, s)⊃ (∀s′′.B(s′′, s′)≡ B(s′′, s)).
The successor state axiom for B preserves this constraint over all situations.
Theorem 14.
{Axioms 1, 6, and 13} | ∀s, s′.B(s′, s)⊃ (∀s′′.B(s′′, s′)≡ B(s′′, s)).
In order to clarify how this constraint ensures that introspection is handled properly, we will show that in the example
illustrated in Fig. 2, the agent introspects its past beliefs. First, we need some notation that allows us to talk about the past.
We use Prev(φ, s) to denote that φ held in the situation immediately before s:
Deﬁnition 15.
Prev(φ, s)
def= ∃a, s′.s = do(a, s′)∧ φ[s′].
Recall that in the example, the agent believed that the light in R1 was off in S ′ , i.e., Bel(¬Light1, S ′). We want to show
that Bel(Prev(Bel(¬Light1)), S ′′) holds, i.e., in S ′′ , the agent believes that in the previous situation it believed that the light
in R1 was off. Consider a situation S∗ that is among the most plausible B-related situations to S ′′ . In this example, there
is only one such situation, namely, S ′′2. We need to show that Prev(Bel(¬Light1), S ′′2) holds, i.e., that Bel(¬Light1, S ′2) holds.
By Theorem 14, S ′2 is B-related to the same situations as S ′ , i.e., S ′1 and S ′2. Since S ′1 is more plausible than S ′2, we only
require that ¬Light1(S ′1) holds. Since this is true, it follows that Bel(Prev(Bel(¬Light1)), S ′′) is also true.
The speciﬁcation of pl and B over the initial situations is the responsibility of the axiomatizer of the domain in question.
This speciﬁcation need not be complete. Of course, a more complete speciﬁcation will yield more interesting properties
about the agent’s current and future belief states.
We have another constraint on the speciﬁcation of B over the initial situations: the situations B-related to an initial
situation are themselves initial, i.e., the agent believes that initially nothing has happened. We assert this constraint as an
initial state axiom:
Axiom 16.
Init(s) ∧ B(s′, s)⊃ Init(s′).
3. Properties
In this section, we highlight some of the more interesting properties of our framework. In order to clarify our explana-
tions and facilitate a comparison with previous approaches to belief change, it will be important for us to attach a speciﬁc
meaning to the use of the terms revision and update, which we will do here. Let Σ denote the set of axioms of the previous
sections (i.e., Axioms 1–16).
3.1. Belief revision
Recall from Section 2 that belief revision is suited to the acquisition of information about static environments for which
the agent may have mistaken or partial information. In our framework, this can only be achieved through the use of sensing
actions since they do not act to modify the environment but rather to tell us something about it. We suppose that for each
formula φ by which we might want to revise, there is a corresponding sensing action capable of determining the truth value
of φ. Moreover, we assume that this sensing action has no effect on the environment; the only ﬂuent it changes is B .11
Deﬁnition 17 (Uniform formula). We call a formula uniform if the only situation term it contains is the situation constant
now and it contains no unbound variables.
11 This is not an overly strict imposition for we can capture sensing actions that modify the domain by “decomposing” the action into a sequence of
non-sensing actions and sensing actions.
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Deﬁnition 18 (Revision action for φ). A revision action A for a uniform formula φ with respect to action theory Σ is a sensing
action that satisﬁes the following condition for every domain-dependent ﬂuent F :
Σ | [∀s.SF(A, s) ≡ φ[s]]∧ [∀s∀
x.F (
x, s) ≡ F (
x,do(A, s))].
In other words, A is a sensing action for the formula φ, and it does not change any physical ﬂuents. Since we assume
there is a revision action A for each formula φ that we might want to revise by, we assume that Σ also contains the
appropriate sensed ﬂuent axioms and successor state axioms to satisfy this deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 19 (Domain-dependent formula). We refer to a formula as domain-dependent if all the ﬂuents mentioned in it are
domain-dependent.
It is easy to see from Deﬁnition 18 that if A is a revision action and φ∗ is domain-dependent, then A does not affect the
value of φ∗ .
Lemma 20. Let φ∗ be a domain-dependent formula, and A be a revision action for some formula φ . Then:
Σ | ∀s.φ∗[s] ≡ φ∗[do(A, s)].
We now show that belief revision is handled appropriately in our system in the sense that if the sensor indicates that
φ holds, then the agent will indeed believe φ after performing A. Similarly, if the sensor indicates that φ is false, then the
agent will believe ¬φ after doing A.
Theorem 21. Let φ be a domain-dependent, uniform formula, and A be a revision action for φ with respect to Σ . It follows that:
Σ | [∀s.φ[s] ⊃ Bel(φ,do(A, s))]∧ [∀s.¬φ[s] ⊃ Bel(¬φ,do(A, s))].
If the agent is indifferent towards φ before doing the action, i.e., does not believe φ or ¬φ, this is a case of belief
expansion. If, before sensing, the agent believes the opposite of what the sensor indicates, then we have belief revision.
Note that this theorem also follows from Scherl and Levesque’s theory. However, for Scherl and Levesque, if the agent
believes ¬φ in S and the sensor indicates that φ is true, then in do(A, S), the agent’s belief state will be inconsistent. The
agent will then believe all propositions, including φ. In our theory, the agent’s belief state will be consistent in this case, as
long as there is some situation S ′ accessible from S that agrees with S on the value of the sensor associated with A.
Theorem 22. Let A be a revision action for a domain-dependent, uniform formula φ with respect to Σ . The following set of sentences
(which we denote by Γ ) is satisﬁable:
Σ ∪ {Bel(¬φ, S0),Bel
(
φ,do(A, S0)
)
,¬Bel(FALSE,do(A, S0)
)}
.
3.2. Belief update
Belief update refers to the belief change that takes place due to a change in the environment. In analogy to revision, we
introduce the notion of an update action.
Deﬁnition 23 (Update action for φ). An update action A for a uniform formula φ with respect to action theory Σ is a
non-sensing action that always makes φ true in the environment. That is, Σ | ∀s.φ[do(A, s)] ∧ SF(A, s).
As with Scherl and Levesque’s theory, the agent’s beliefs are updated appropriately when an update action A for φ
occurs, i.e., the agent will believe φ after A is performed.
Theorem 24. Let A be an update action for φ . Then:
Σ | ∀s.Bel(φ,do(A, s)).
In our framework, we can represent actions that do not fall under the category of update actions. Of particular interest
are ones whose effects depend on what is true in the current situation, i.e., conditional effects. We can prove an analogous
theorem for such actions. Suppose that A is a non-sensing action, i.e., Σ | ∀s.SF(A, s), and that A is an action that causes
φ′ to hold, whenever φ holds beforehand. Further suppose that the agent believes φ in S . Then, after performing A in S ,
the agent ought to believe that φ′ holds.
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Σ | ∀s.Bel(φ, s) ∧ ∀s′SF(A, s′)∧ (∀s′.φ[s′]⊃ φ′[do(A, s′)])⊃ Bel(φ′,do(A, s)).
It is very important to note that in our framework, there are no actions that correspond directly to the actions “revise
by φ” or “update by φ”. We only have physical actions and sensing actions. It is, therefore, the properties associated with
these actions by the successor state and sensed ﬂuent axioms that determine how (and whether) the agent’s beliefs get
revised or updated.
3.3. Introspection
Since we constrained the accessibility relation to be transitive and Euclidean, our agents are guaranteed to be introspec-
tive.
Theorem 26.
Σ | [Bel(φ, s) ⊃ Bel(Bel(φ), s)]∧ [¬Bel(φ, s) ⊃ Bel(¬Bel(φ), s)].
3.4. Awareness of mistakes
In Section 2.2, we claimed that the agent can also introspect its past beliefs. Suppose that the agent believes ¬φ in S ,
and after performing a revision action A for φ in S , the agent believes φ. In do(A, S), the agent should also believe that in
the previous situation φ was true, but it believed φ was false. In other words, the agent should believe that it was mistaken
about φ. We now prove a theorem that states that the agent will indeed believe that it was mistaken about φ.
Theorem 27. Let A be a revision action for a domain-dependent, uniform formula φ with respect to Σ . Then:
Σ | ∀s.Bel(¬φ, s) ∧ Bel(φ,do(A, s))⊃ Bel(Prev(φ ∧ Bel(¬φ)),do(A, s)).
The properties presented in this section demonstrate the elegance and the power of our framework. While the framework
itself is not overly complex, it provides a powerful system in which to reason about the beliefs of an agent in a dynamic
environment with the capability to perform actions and to sense the environment.
4. Example
We now present an example to illustrate how this theory of belief change can be applied. We model a world in which
there are two rooms, R1 and R2. The agent can move between the rooms. Each room contains a light that can be on or
off. The agent has two binary sensors. One sensor detects whether or not the light is on in the room in which the agent is
currently located. The other sensor detects whether or not the agent is in R1.
We have three ﬂuents: Light1(s) (Light2(s), respectively), which holds if and only if there is light in R1 (R2, respectively)
in situation s, and InR1(s), which holds if the agent is in R1 in s. If the agent is not in R1, then it is assumed to be in R2.
There are three actions: the agent leaves the room it is in and enters the other room (leave), the agent senses whether it
is in R1 (senseInR1), and the agent senses whether the light is on in the room in which it is currently located (senseLight).
The successor state axioms and guarded sensed ﬂuent axioms for our example, which we will call E , are as follows:
Light1(do(a, s)) ≡ Light1(s)
Light2(do(a, s)) ≡ Light2(s)
InR1(do(a, s)) ≡ ((¬InR1(s) ∧ a = leave) ∨ (InR1(s) ∧ a = leave))
TRUE ⊃ (SF(leave, s) ≡ TRUE)
InR1(s) ⊃ (SF(senseLight, s) ≡ Light1(s))
¬InR1(s) ⊃ (SF(senseLight, s) ≡ Light2(s))
TRUE ⊃ (SF(senseInR1, s) ≡ InR1(s))
Next we must specify the initial state. This includes both the physical state of the domain and the belief state of the
agent. First we describe the initial physical state of the domain, by saying which domain-dependent ﬂuents hold in the
actual initial situation, S0. Initially, the lights in both rooms are on and the agent is in R2 (this is illustrated on the left-
hand side of Fig. 3):
Light1(S0) ∧ ¬InR1(S0) ∧ Light2(S0).
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The initial belief state of the agent is illustrated in Fig. 3. It shows that in the most plausible situations B-related to S0
(the ones with plausibility 0 in the ﬁgure), ¬Light1 and InR1 hold. In the next most plausible situations B-related to S0
(the ones with plausibility 1), Light1 and InR1 hold. In the third most plausible (the ones with plausibility 2) B-related
situations to S0, Light2 and ¬InR1 hold. There is also at least one situation in the latter group in which Light1 holds
and one in which ¬Light1 holds. Specifying this belief state directly can be cumbersome. For example, the axiom for the
situations with plausibility 1 is:
(∃s.Init(s) ∧ B(s, S0) ∧ pl(s) = 1
)∧
(∀s.Init(s) ∧ pl(s) = 1⊃ Light1(s) ∧ InR1(s)
)
.
For now, we will not enumerate the set of axioms that specify the belief state shown in Fig. 3. But we assume that we
have such a set which, together with the axioms for the initial physical state, we refer to as I . After we have discussed the
example, we will show that there is a more elegant way to specify the initial belief state of the agent. So for this example,
we add E , and I to Σ , and obtain the following:
Proposition 28. The following formulae are entailed by Σ ∪ E ∪ I:
1. Bel(¬Light1 ∧ InR1, S0)
2. Bel(Light1 ∧ InR1,do(senseLight, S0))
3. Bel(¬InR1,do(senseInR1,do(senseLight, S0)))
4. Bel(Prev(¬InR1 ∧ Bel(InR1)),do(senseInR1,do(senseLight, S0)))
5. ¬Bel(Light1,do(senseInR1,do(senseLight, S0)))∧
¬Bel(¬Light1,do(senseInR1,do(senseLight, S0)))
6. Bel(InR1,do(leave,do(senseInR1,do(senseLight, S0))))
7. Bel(Light1 ,
do(senseLight,
do(leave,do(senseInR1,
do(senseLight, S0))))).
We shall now give a short, informal explanation of why each part of the previous theorem holds.
1. In the most plausible situations B-related to S0, ¬Light1 ∧ InR1 holds.
2. Even though the agent believes that it is in R1 initially, it is actually in R2. Therefore, its light sensor is measuring
whether there is light in R2, even though the agent thinks that it is measuring whether there is light in R1. It turns
out that there is light in R2 in S0, so the sensor returns 1. Since the agent believes that the light sensor is measuring
whether there is light in R1 and in all the situations with plausibility 0, there is no light in R1, those situations are
dropped from the B relation. In the situations with plausibility 1, the light is on in R1, so those situations are retained.
In those situations Light1∧ InR1 holds and those ﬂuents are not affected by the senseLight action, so the agent believes
Light1 ∧ InR1 after doing senseLight.
3. Now the agent senses whether it is in R1. Again the agent’s most plausible situations conﬂict with what is actually the
case, so they are dropped from the B relation. The situations with plausibility 2 become the most plausible situations,
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so the agent believes it is not in R1. By using plausibilities we allow for “fallback” situations and thus deal with settings
that Scherl and Levesque [5,6] cannot handle. Their formalism would have descended into inconsistency in this case
as there would be no situations in which ¬InR1 is possible. In fact, this would already have happened after the ﬁrst
sensing action senseLight. Scherl and Levesque can only reason about situations that are consistent with the agent’s
current beliefs and therefore cannot deal with sensing results that conﬂict with these beliefs where an account of belief
revision, such as the one offered here, is required.
4. By Theorem 27, the agent realizes that it was mistaken about being in R1.
5. Among the situations with plausibility 2, there is one in which the light is on in R1 and one in which it is not on.
Therefore, the agent is unsure as to whether the light is on.
6. Now the agent leaves R2 and enters R1. This happens in all the B-related situations as well. Therefore, the agent
believes that it is in R1. This is an example of an update.
7. The light in R1 was on initially, and since no action was performed that changed the state of the light, the light remains
on. After checking its light sensor, the agent believes that the light is on in R1.
A more complete illustration of this example is given in Fig. 4.
This example shows that the agent’s beliefs change appropriately after both revision actions and update actions. The
example also demonstrates that our formalism can accommodate iterated belief change. The agent goes from believing that
the light is not on, to believing that it is on, to not believing one way or the other, and then back to believing that it is on.
To facilitate the speciﬁcation of the initial belief state of the agent, we ﬁnd it convenient to deﬁne another belief operator
⇒ , in the spirit of the conditional logic connective [21]:
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φ ⇒s ψ def=
∀s′.B(s′, s)∧ φ[s′]∧ (∀s′′.B(s′′, s)∧ φ[s′′]⊃ pl(s′) pl(s′′))⊃ ψ[s′].
φ ⇒s ψ holds if in the most plausible situations B-related to s where φ holds, ψ also holds. Note that for any situation S ,
Bel(φ, S) is equivalent to (TRUE ⇒S φ).
We can use this operator to specify the initial belief state of the agent without having to explicitly mention the plausi-
bility of situations. To obtain the results of Proposition 28, it suﬃces to let I be the following set of axioms:
Light1(S0) ∧ ¬InR1(S0) ∧ Light2(S0)
TRUE ⇒S0 ¬Light1 ∧ InR1
Light1 ⇒S0 InR1
¬(Light2 ∧ ¬InR1 ⇒S0 Light1)
¬(Light2 ∧ ¬InR1 ⇒S0 ¬Light1)
It is easy to see that the belief state depicted in Fig. 3 satisﬁes these axioms. In the most plausible worlds, (¬Light1 ∧
InR1) holds. In the most plausible worlds where the light in R1 is on, the agent is in R1. Finally, the last two axioms state
that among the most plausible worlds where the light is on in R2 and the agent is in R2, there is one where the light is off
in R1 and one in which the light is on (respectively).
5. Postulate soundness
In this section, we consider the extent to which our framework satisﬁes the AGM postulates for belief revision, the KM
postulates for belief update, and the DP postulates for iterated belief revision. In order to do so we ﬁrst need to establish
a common footing. The ﬁrst notion to establish is what is meant by the belief state of the agent. We deﬁne a belief state
(relative to a given situation) to consist of those formulae believed true at a particular situation. We limit our attention
to uniform, domain-dependent formulae, since these frameworks only consider objective formulae (i.e., formulae without
belief operators), and they do not have an explicit representation of state, but rather they implicitly refer to the current
state, and so there is no need to consider beliefs regarding more than one situation. Therefore, the language we use here,
Lnow , is a set of domain-dependent uniform formulae. We assume that Lnow is propositional and ﬁnite.12 φ, ψ , and γ will
be used to denote domain-dependent uniform formulae. Also, t and u, possibly decorated, will be used to denote ground
situation terms.
In the previous section, we used a theory to specify the beliefs of the agent. We said that the agent believed (did not
believe, respectively) a formula, if the theory entailed that the formula was believed (not believed, respectively). Unless the
theory is complete with respect to the beliefs of the agent, we will not be able to determine whether some formulae are
believed or not. In other words, there could be more than one model of the theory. This is not the case for the semantic
frameworks for belief change, e.g., the AGM framework. There the belief state of the agent is also determined by a set of
sentences, however, there is also an implicit closed world assumption. The sentences in the set are believed by the agent,
and if a sentence is not in the set, then it is not believed by the agent. There is no uncertainty about what is believed by
the agent, i.e., the belief state of the agent can be represented by a single model. To bring our framework in line with the
AGM framework, we assume that we have a model M of Σ , which will be used to ﬁx the belief state of the agent. We can
encode an AGM belief state K in our setting using M and a ground situation term t such that M | Bel(φ, t) if and only if
φ ∈ K .
We need to deﬁne the three operators used in the postulates: belief expansion, revision and update. The operators in
the postulates map belief states to new belief states. Our framework is based on situations and actions rather than belief
sets and their operators, so we will use a different representation and then translate the postulates appropriately. Our
revision and update operators are actions, i.e., they map situations into situations. Sensing actions lead to belief revision,
and physical actions yield belief update. Iterated revisions and updates are handled using sequences of actions. However,
there is no action type that corresponds to belief expansion. Therefore, we deﬁne the expansion operator directly as a belief
state as discussed below. As a consequence, expansions cannot be iterated, but the postulates do not require that we iterate
them.
We ﬁrst deﬁne a function that maps a situation t into the belief state of the agent at t .
12 We make this assumption to accord with the AGM and KM frameworks, however this assumption is only used in the proof for the soundness of (K 8)
(Lemma 57).
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K (t) = {ψ: M | Bel(ψ, t)}.
It is easily veriﬁed that K (t) is closed under deduction.
Recall that the expansion of a belief state K by a formula φ is deﬁned to be the belief state that results from simply
adding φ to K . If φ is inconsistent with K , then the belief state that results from adding φ to K will be inconsistent. We
can encode this in our framework as an operator that maps a situation t and a formula φ into a belief state, but this time
it will be the belief set that results from adding φ to K (t).
Deﬁnition 31 (t + φ). We denote the expansion of t by φ (in M) by t + φ and deﬁne it as follows:
t + φ = {ψ: M | Bel(φ ⊃ ψ, t)}.
So, the belief state that results from expanding t with φ is the set of formulae that are believed to be implied by φ in t .
Since our expansion operator does not return a situation, it can only be applied last in a sequence of operations. This is the
case for all of the postulates, so this deﬁnition suﬃces for our purposes.
Next, we deﬁne the revision of t by φ, t ∗ φ, as the situation that results from performing a revision action for φ in t . As
we said earlier, we assume that for any φ under consideration, there is a revision action Aφ for φ with respect to Σ . When
φ is clear from the context, we will drop the subscript. In the AGM setting, a revision K ∗ φ is interpreted as the revision
of beliefs K after learning φ. In our case, we do not know whether φ will be true until after performing the revision action.
Accordingly, we deﬁne a revision of t by φ only in the case that φ happens to be true in situation t (i.e., M | φ[t]).
Deﬁnition 32 (t ∗ φ). We denote the revision of t by φ (in M) as t ∗ φ and deﬁne it as follows:
t ∗ φ = do(Aφ, t),
whenever M | φ[t]. If M | ¬φ[t], then t ∗ φ is undeﬁned.
5.1. AGM postulates
Here are the AGM postulates translated into our notation.
(K∗1) K (t ∗ φ) is deductively closed
(K∗2) φ ∈ K (t ∗ φ)
(K∗3) K (t ∗ φ) ⊆ t + φ
(K∗4) If ¬φ /∈ K (t), then t + φ ⊆ K (t ∗ φ)
(K∗5) K (t ∗ φ) =Lnow
(K∗6) If | φ ≡ ψ , then K (t ∗ φ) = K (t ∗ ψ)
(K∗7) K (t ∗ φ ∧ ψ) ⊆ (t ∗ φ) + ψ
(K∗8) If ¬ψ /∈ K (t ∗ φ), then (t ∗ φ) + ψ ⊆ K (t ∗ φ ∧ ψ)
Note that (K∗5) is somewhat different from the corresponding standard AGM postulate. This is due to the fact that it is
not possible in our framework to revise with an identically false formula, since t ∗ φ is only deﬁned if M | φ[t]. To obtain
(K∗5) in our framework, we require a further assumption, i.e., that initially the agent does not think that the actual situation
is completely implausible, i.e., B is reﬂexive.13 This does not mean that we get knowledge instead of belief, since the actual
situation does not have to be most plausible, but it must not be completely implausible. We use an initial state axiom to
state this assumption:
Axiom 33.
Init(s) ⊃ B(s, s).
We add this axiom to Σ , and it follows that B is everywhere reﬂexive:
Theorem 34.
Σ | ∀sB(s, s).
13 Note that strictly speaking, we only need the initial situation that precedes t to be self-accessible, however the theorem is easier to state if we assume
that all initial situations are self-accessible.
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Corollary 35.
Σ | ∀s¬Bel(FALSE, s).
Finally, we are now able to show that our translations of the AGM postulates are satisﬁed.
Theorem 36. For any model M of Σ , the AGM postulates (K∗1)–(K∗8) are satisﬁed, when ∗ is deﬁned as in Deﬁnition 32 for any
situation t and domain-dependent uniform formulae φ and ψ .
5.2. KM postulates
We now turn to deﬁning belief update in our framework, which is deﬁned analogously to revision but using an update
action instead of a revision action. The update of a situation t with a consistent formula φ is the situation that results from
performing an update action for φ in t . We can only handle consistent formulae because according to the deﬁnition of an
update action A, Σ | ∀s.φ[do(A, s)], which must be false if φ is inconsistent. We will assume that for any consistent φ
under consideration, there is at least one update action for φ with respect to Σ , and that we have a function ua which
maps a consistent formula φ into an update action for φ such that for any ψ , if | φ ≡ ψ then ua(φ) = ua(ψ) (we only
need this condition for postulate (K  5)).
Deﬁnition 37. We deﬁne the update of t by φ to be:
t  φ = do(ua(φ), t).
In order to translate postulate (K  8) into our framework, we need to deﬁne ⋂w∈[K ] w  φ. As we saw above, [K ] is
the set of complete, consistent (cc) theories that contain K , and a cc theory can be thought of as a possible world. We use
situations as possible worlds, so given a belief set at a situation t , we need a set of situations that corresponds to the set of
all cc extensions of K (t). We can easily map situations into cc theories.
Deﬁnition 38 (Tr(t)). We deﬁne the truths at t (in M) to be:
Tr(t) = {ψ: M | ψ[t]}.
Since Lnow is propositional, the minimal accessible situations from t coincide with the cc extensions of K (t). Let MPB(t)
denote {t′: MPB(t′, t)}.
Lemma 39. w ∈ [K (t)] if and only if there exists t′ ∈MPB(t) such that w = Tr(t′).
Now, we can translate the equation in the postulate as follows:
K (t  φ) =
⋂
t′∈MPB(t)
Tr
(
t′  φ).
In other words, the belief set that results from updating t by φ is the same as the intersection of the truths that result from
updating each member of MPB(t) by φ.
Here is a translation of the KM postulates into our notation14:
(K  1) K (t  φ) is deductively closed
(K  2) φ ∈ K (t  φ)
(K  3) If φ ∈ K (t), then K (t  φ) = K (t)
(K  4) K (t  φ) =Lnow iff K (t) | FALSE
(K  5) If | φ ≡ ψ , then K (t  φ) = K (t  ψ)
(K  6) K (t  (φ ∧ ψ)) ⊆ (t  φ) + ψ
(K  7) If K (t) is complete and ¬ψ /∈ K (t  φ), then (t  φ) + ψ ⊆ K (t  (φ ∧ ψ))
(K  8) If MPB(t) = ∅ then K (t  φ) =⋂t′∈MPB(t) Tr(t′  φ)
Theorem 40. K (t  φ) satisﬁes KM postulates (K  1), (K  2), (K  4), (K  5), (K  8) when  is deﬁned as in Deﬁnition 37 for any
situation t and consistent domain-dependent uniform formulae φ and ψ .
14 For (K  4), note that if φ | FALSE, then t  φ is not deﬁned, since φ has to be consistent.
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make φ true, it may have other effects. In fact, it is not possible in our framework to deﬁne an update action that makes an
arbitrary φ true and no other changes because our action theories do not handle disjunctive effects of actions. If φ is of the
form ψ1 ∨ ψ2, then we could have an action that only makes ψ1 true and one that only makes ψ2 true, but not one that
only makes the disjunction true.
Boutilier [19] has a problem with (K  3) ((U2) in the KM rendering) for similar reasons. In his framework, (update)
actions have plausibilities, and the most plausible action explaining the new information is assumed to have taken place.
It could be that this action has other effects. To satisfy this postulate, he introduces a null event and considers a model in
which this is the most plausible event at any world.
5.3. DP postulates
In our framework, iterated revision corresponds to the performing of at least two consecutive revision actions. We now
show that there is some correspondence with the Darwiche and Pearl [18] account of iterated belief revision. Here are the
DP postulates translated into our notation.
(DP1) If ψ | φ, then K ((t ∗ φ) ∗ ψ) = K (t ∗ ψ)
(DP2) If ψ | ¬φ, then K ((t ∗ φ) ∗ ψ) = K (t ∗ ψ)
(DP3) If φ ∈ K (t ∗ ψ), then φ ∈ K ((t ∗ φ) ∗ ψ)
(DP4) If ¬φ /∈ K (t ∗ ψ), then ¬φ /∈ K ((t ∗ φ) ∗ ψ)
Theorem 41. Postulates (DP1), (DP3) and (DP4) are satisﬁed when ∗ is deﬁned as in Deﬁnition 32 for any situation t and domain-
dependent uniform formulae φ and ψ .
Interestingly, changes of the type described by (DP2) are not deﬁned according to our view of belief revision. In the case
where ψ | ¬φ, either t ∗ φ or t ∗ ψ is undeﬁned, therefore K ((t ∗ φ) ∗ ψ) is undeﬁned.
6. Discussion
There are various aspects of our framework that deserve further consideration. We address what we consider to be some
of the more important issues here.
This work continues the tradition begun by John McCarthy [2,3,22] exploring the use of symbolic representations for
representing and reasoning about dynamic systems. The legacy of the situation calculus has proved an inﬂuential and lasting
contribution to research on reasoning about action and change. It provides the foundations upon which our framework is
built. McCarthy’s early work [2,3] supplied the basic theory underlying the situation calculus and it is from here that we
take our departure point. His later work [22] identiﬁes the frame problem and other issues that need to be addressed when
using the situation calculus. While we have not utilized McCarthy’s [23] circumscription to solve the frame problem but
rather followed Reiter’s [4] successor state axiom approach, Reiter’s approach is certainly inﬂuenced by the development of
circumscription and its use to solve the frame problem. Our approach is also built on the insights of Moore [11] who reiﬁes
the accessibility relation used in the semantics for modal logics. This approach to modality is supported by McCarthy [24].
Our plausibility function is based on ordinal conditional functions [18,20] (particularly Spohn’s κ-rankings). However, our
assignment of plausibilities to situations is ﬁxed, whereas in most frameworks based on assigning plausibilities to worlds,
the plausibility assigned to a world can change when revisions occur. The dynamics of belief in our framework derives
from the dynamics of the B-relation, rather than that of the plausibility assignment. Note that Friedman and Halpern
[25] make similar assumptions to ours. In Darwiche and Pearl’s framework [18], the κ-ranking of a world that does not
satisfy the formula in a revision increases by 1. However, if the world satisﬁes the revision formula in future revisions, the
world’s κ-ranking decreases, and if it decreases to 0, the world will take part in determining the beliefs of the agent. In our
framework, when a sensing action occurs, any situation S ′ that disagrees with the actual value of the sensor is removed from
the B relation (actually, its successor is removed). The successors of S ′ will never be readmitted to B , so they will never
help determine the beliefs of the agent. This amounts to saying that the information that the agent learns from sensing
is knowledge, i.e., the agent will never get new information that contradicts previous sensing information. However, this is
quite reasonable since our framework assumes exact sensing and that there are no exogenous actions, so the agent should
expect that its sensory information will not be contradicted. For a generalization of our framework to the noisy sensing case
that also allows plausibility update, please see [26]. Our framework was generalized to handle exogenous actions in [27].
One may think that having a ﬁxed plausibility assignment limits the applicability of our approach. Consider an example15
where, most plausibly, a cat is asleep at home, but where after phoning home, most plausibly, the cat is awake. (Nothing is
certain in either case.) This might seem to require adjustment of the plausibility assignment to situations.
15 We are indebted to Jim Delgrande for this example.
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ministic, with effects described by successor state axioms, quite apart from properties of belief and plausibility. If in some
situations a phone action wakes the cat, and in others not, then there has to be some property M such that we can write a
successor state axiom of the following form:
Awake
(
do(a, s)
)≡ (a = phone∧ M(s))∨
[. . .other actions that can wake cats . . .] ∨
(
Awake(s) ∧ [a is not some put-to-sleep action]).
For example, M could represent that “the phone’s ringer is loud enough to wake the cat”. With this model, we can then
arrange the B relation in the initial situation so that there are four groups of situations s′ B-related to S0, where the
following hold (in order of decreasing plausibility): (1) M(s′)∧¬Awake(s′), (2) M(s′)∧Awake(s′), (3) ¬M(s′)∧¬Awake(s′),
and (4) ¬M(s′) ∧ Awake(s′). Then we obtain that
Bel(¬Awake, S0),
holds since the most plausible situations s′ that are B-related to S0 satisfy M(s′)∧¬Awake(s′). However, the most plausible
situations B-related to do(phone, S0) are those situations do(phone, s′) where s′ is from group (1). Since M(s′) holds, so
does Awake(do(phone, s′)) by the successor state axiom for Awake above. Therefore,
Bel
(
Awake,do(phone, S0)
)
,
holds, exactly as desired.16 Of course, in this formalization, we also get that:
Bel(M, S0),
but this is to be expected: why would we believe it most likely that the cat would be awake after the phone rings, if we
did not also believe it most likely that the ringer was loud enough to waken it? In sum, we can account for changing our
minds about the plausibility of the cat being awake without needing to change the plausibility ordering over situations.
We can also handle a variant of this example where we change our mind about whether phoning home wakes the cat.
For example, imagine a sensing action examineRinger that informs us that M is false initially (e.g., the ringer on the phone
is set to low). Then, we get that
Bel
(¬Awake,do(phone,do(examineRinger, S0)
))
holds, since the most plausible situations will now be descendants of the s′ that are B-related to S0 in group (3), where
¬M(s′) ∧ ¬Awake(s′) holds. This is exactly as desired, and again without needing to change the plausibility assignment.
In the process of developing the approach described in this paper, we experimented with various schemes where the
plausibility assigned to situations could be updated. But as discussed in Section 2.1 we found that this led to problems
for introspection. Consider a scheme where we combine the plausibility assignment with the belief accessibility relation by
adding an extra argument to the B relation, i.e., where B(s′,n, s) means that in situation s the agent thinks s′ is plausible
to degree n. In order to ensure that beliefs are properly introspected, the relation would have to satisfy the constraint (TE)
discussed in Section 2.1, which is similar to the one given in Theorem 14, but taking plausibilities into account. That is to
say, all the B-related situations to a situation s must have the same belief structure as s, i.e., they should be B-related to
the same situations with the same plausibilities as s. Unfortunately, this conﬂicts with some of our intuitions about how to
change plausibilities to accommodate new information.
Consider an example where we have two situations S0 and S1, and where initially the agent considers situation S1
more plausible than S0, i.e., B(S1,0, S0), B(S0,1, S0), B(S1,0, S1), B(S0,1, S1). Notice that S0 and S1 have the same belief
structure. Suppose that Light1(S0) ∧ SF(senseLight, S0) holds as does ¬Light1(S1) ∧ ¬SF(senseLight, S1). The natural way
to update the plausibilities after sensing would be to make the most plausible situations from a situation do(senseLight, s)
be the ones that agree with s on the value of SF(senseLight). So, if we let S ′0 denote do(senseLight, S0) and S ′1 denote
do(senseLight, S1), then in S ′0, S ′0 should be more plausible than S ′1 and in S ′1, S ′1 should be more plausible than S ′0. But
this would violate the constraint that B-related situations have the same belief structure, and cause introspection to fail.
One way to avoid this problem would be to update the plausibilities of all situations based on what holds in the ‘actual’
situations, i.e., S0 and its successors (this focuses attention on beliefs that hold in actual situations, which is what we
normally do anyway). For the example above, we would look at how the plausibilities should change in S ′0 and adjust the
plausibilities in the situations B-related to S ′0 (in this case just S ′1) in the same way. We would then have that S ′0 is more
plausible than S ′1 in both S ′0 and S ′1, i.e., B(S ′0,0, S ′0), B(S ′1,1, S ′0), B(S ′0,0, S ′1), B(S ′1,1, S ′1). Notice that S ′0 and S ′1 have the
same belief structure, so the constraint violation mentioned above is resolved.
Unfortunately, under this new scheme we have a problem with beliefs about future beliefs. If we were to redeﬁne
Bel in the obvious way to accommodate the extra argument in B , our example would entail the very counterintuitive
16 We can also handle a variant where nothing is believed about the cat sleeping initially by making the groups (1) and (2) the most plausible.
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after sensing he will believe that it is on. Our approach—which uses a ﬁxed plausibility ordering on situations and simply
drops situations that conﬂict with sensing results from the B relation—avoids both of these problems.
Hunter [28, pp. 67–69] claims that revision operators ∗ as deﬁned by Deﬁnition 32 are, strictly speaking, not functions
since given two different situations t , t′ where K (t) = K (t′) it is not always the case that t ∗ φ = t′ ∗ φ. However, by
Deﬁnition 32, t ∗ φ is deﬁned as do(Aφ, t) and so each revision function ∗ can be considered deﬁned relative to a particular
situation. We could, as it were, write this more precisely as ∗t however our interest here is to examine how closely our
framework complies with the AGM framework and not to use it to deﬁne AGM-like revision operators.17
7. Comparison to other frameworks
One proposal that is related to ours is that of Demolombe and Pozos Parra [29]. Rather than reifying the accessibility
relation in the style of Moore [11] and Scherl and Levesque [5,6] as we do here, they introduce belief modalities Bi and
successor state axioms for these modal operators. For each modal operator Bi and ﬂuent F two successor state axioms are
required:
Bi
(
F
(
do(a, s)
))≡ Γ +i1,F (a, s) ∨ Bi
(
F (s)
)∧ ¬Γ −i1,F (a, s),
Bi
(¬F (do(a, s)))≡ Γ +i2,F (a, s) ∨ Bi
(¬F (s))∧ ¬Γ −i2,F (a, s).
Furthermore, these modal operators are assumed to obey axioms for the modal logic KD. Each modal operator can be used to
represent the beliefs of a different agent. In our framework this would be achieved through the introduction of accessibility
relations Bi (as noted in [29]). One issue that Demolombe and Pozos Parra point to is that our approach assumes that every
agent agrees on the same set of effects (i.e., successor state axioms) for each ﬂuent. More precisely, our approach is directed
towards representing and reasoning about the beliefs of a single agent. This agent can reason about actions performed by
other agents as these are treated as exogenous actions. To deal with multiple agents, the axioms for each (precondition,
successor state, etc.) would be grouped into separate action theories and reasoned about separately. This seems appropriate
since each agent reasons about its own beliefs using its own conception of the world. This does not preclude that agents
can also reason about other agents’ beliefs. Demolombe and Pozos Parra [29] also consider that their approach might be
better suited to dealing with noisy sensors.
In [30] Demolombe and Pozos Para propose another solution which adopts an accessibility relation along the lines of
Moore [11] and Scherl and Levesque [5,6] however, in order to deal with multiple agents, they include a term for agents.
More speciﬁcally, their accessibility relation is of the form K (i, s′, s) meaning that situation s′ is compatible with agent i’s
beliefs in situation s. Their notion of belief B(i, φ(s′, s), s′, s) is deﬁned as follows:
B
(
i, φ
(
s′, s
)
, s′, s
) def= ∀s′(K (i, s′, s)⊃ φ(s′, s))
Their aim is to deal with belief change in the situation calculus without recourse to plausibilities. They introduce the notion
of real and imaginary situations and the actions whose occurrence can be witnessed by an agent. Real situations correspond
to the actual situations in which the agent is placed18 while imaginary situations are simply those alternative situations
which are compatible with the agent’s beliefs. Each agent can have different successor state axioms for ﬂuents and also for
real and imaginary situations. The successor state axioms take the form
∀s∀s′∀a∀
x(real(s) ⊃ (K (i, s′, s)⊃ (p(
x,do(a, s′))≡
Γ +i,p
(
i, 
x,a, s′)∨ (a = sensep(i) ∧ p(
x, s)
)∨ p(
x, s′)∧
¬(Γ −i,p
(
i, 
x,a, s′)∨ (a = sensep(i) ∧ ¬p(
x, s)
)))))
where sensep(i) is a sensing action informing i about the truth of p(
x, s). The distinction between real and imaginary
situations allows the agent to maintain K -related situations even when they do not accord with the agent’s observations.
Note however that as we have indicated in Section 4, the actual plausibility values themselves are not important and we
provide a way of applying our framework without having to supply these values explicitly.
Another proposal for handling belief revision in the situation calculus is that of del Val and Shoham [31]. Their approach
models beliefs through formulae of the form holds(bel(φ), s) and a causal axiom:
∀s∀μ(∃s′.holds(bel(μ), s′))⊃ holds(bel(μ), result(learn(μ), s)).
They use a circumscription policy to reason about the effects of performing actions and to reason about beliefs. Both our
approaches are characterized axiomatically, however theirs does contain an assumption that they did not axiomatize, namely
17 Note that Darwiche and Pearl’s [18] revision operators are deﬁned similarly.
18 As such, the successor of a real situation is also a real situation.
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they do not handle belief introspection and our formal apparatus is much simpler than theirs.
Friedman and Halpern’s [25] approach is to begin with a very general framework that combines state dynamics with
belief, and to see what further constraints need to be placed in order to capture the standard approaches to belief revision
and update. It is interesting to note that there are several points in common between our belief revision frameworks. We
both generalized an existing framework for representing knowledge using possible worlds by adding a plausibility structure
to the worlds. Both of our possible worlds contain the history of all actions or events until the current time. We both
make the assumption that the set of accessible worlds at a given time is a subset of the accessible worlds at earlier times.
Friedman and Halpern’s framework, like ours, contains the assumption that the agent does not revise its assessment of
the relative plausibility of situations. Rather, the agent is assumed to have a prior assessment of the relative plausibility of
situations and the dynamics of the agent’s beliefs arises from dropping possible worlds that conﬂict with new information.
As a consequence, their agents also cannot recover from inconsistency. However, they consider this to be a problem with
the postulates rather than with their framework.
Friedman and Halpern have a similar constraint to (TE). They require that accessible situations have the same plausibility
structure. Both of our frameworks are synchronous in that accessible situations have the same “current time”, and both our
agents have perfect recall for past actions. One point of difference between our frameworks is that they need separate sets
of constraints to obtain revision and update, so they cannot intersperse revisions and updates, whereas we can.
We have already noted above that the plausibility ordering remains ﬁxed in our framework, yet this is suﬃcient to yield
some rather desirable properties. However, several proposals for modifying plausibility orderings have been put forward in
the literature (many stemming from the work of Spohn [20]). Boutilier [32] and Williams [33] propose a scheme whereby,
upon receiving new information φ, the most plausible φ-worlds become the most plausible worlds while all other worlds
retain their relative levels of plausibility. Spohn [20] (and Darwiche and Pearl [18]) adopt a method where φ and ¬φ-worlds
retain their relative levels of plausibility amongst themselves, but the two groups are “shifted” relative to each other, mak-
ing the most plausible φ-worlds the most plausible worlds. However, these approaches do not consider belief introspection.
While plausibilities themselves do not change in our framework, it must be kept in mind that the B-relation is also im-
portant in terms of determining belief and it may certainly change as a result of performing sensing actions. Furthermore,
changes in belief can also be brought about by non-sensing actions which have the capacity to alter the environment.
The main aspect that distinguishes our work from previous approaches is the ability to represent belief introspection
properties within the object language together with the facility to achieve iterated revision and update in a uniﬁed frame-
work.
Belief change in the situation calculus has already been dealt with by Scherl and Levesque [6]. However, as noted previ-
ously, while they can handle belief update, they are limited to belief expansion. Del Val and Shoham [31] also address the
issue of belief change in the situation calculus, and their theory deals with both revision and update. However, they cannot
represent nested belief and consequently cannot deal with the issues of belief introspection and mistaken belief.
There are a variety of frameworks that accommodate both belief revision and belief update. As noted, this is one strength
of the proposal by del Val and Shoham [31]. In a more traditional belief change setting, Boutilier [34] also provides a general
framework that allows for both these forms of change. However, this framework cannot deal with introspection in the
object language. One approach that supports both belief revision and update and also handles introspection is Friedman and
Halpern [25]. Their approach to revision and update is fairly standard, but set within a very general modal logic framework
that combines operators for knowledge, belief (interpreted using a plausibility ordering), and time. But they do not discuss
interactions between revision and update and introspection. The work of Demolombe and Pozos Parra [29,30] can also
handle belief introspection.
Another avenue of related work is that of modal logic accounts of belief change. Our account, taking some of its heritage
from Moore [11], reiﬁes the accessibility relation central to modal semantics. In an early work, Segerberg [35] developed a
dynamic doxastic logic in which action modalities [+Bφ], [−Bφ] and [∗Bφ] denote expansion, contraction and revision of
the agent’s belief state by Bφ respectively. This allows for formulas like [∗Bφ]Bψ with the meaning that revising the agent’s
belief state by belief in φ will result in belief in ψ . In Segerberg’s framework, expansion, contraction, and revision are treated
as actions working with belief formulas like Bφ. This contrasts with our framework where there are only physical actions
(leading to belief update) and sensing actions (leading to belief revision). More recent developments in this area include
Herzig and Longin [36] who introduce a modal logic approach to this problem. Their language is based on propositional
dynamic logic and introduces a modal belief operator Bel and the underlying logic is KD45. They introduce two successor
state axioms:
(
perc(a,b) ∧ ¬Aftera ⊥ ∧¬BelAfterb ⊥
)⊃ (FeasibleaBelA ≡ BelAfterb A),
(
perc(a,b) ∧ ¬Aftera ⊥ ∧BelAfterb ⊥
)⊃ (FeasibleaBelA ≡ BelAfterenablebAfterb A).
Their framework is capable of dealing with non-deterministic actions and misperception. Information is acquired when an
observation action observe(φ) is performed. observe(φ) has φ as precondition. A “test action” testIf (φ) (similar to a sensing
action) is treated as a non-deterministic choice between observe(φ) and observe(¬φ). Thus in their framework, the need
for belief revision arises when an action that is believed not to be executable is nonetheless perceived. As we can see in
the second axiom above, this is handled by performing a special type of action enablea whose effect is to make action a
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alternatives. But only beliefs in the observed facts (and more generally the action’s preconditions) are revised. These beliefs
may have arisen due to other incorrect assumptions, but the latter would not be revised, unlike in a plausibility-based
approach. It is not clear whether introspection about belief change is handled properly.
There has been a lot of work recently on this type of modal logic of knowledge/belief and action, for instance the
work of van Ditmarsch et al. [37], where the paradigm of dynamic epistemic logic, a family of epistemic/doxastic logics
with announcements and assignments/updates is developed. In van Ditmarsch et al. [38], an optimal regression method is
developed for reasoning about knowledge and action within this type of propositional logic. However, most of this work does
not deal with belief revision (one exception is Chapter 3 of [37], which is based on [35]). Van Benthem [39] also develops
the correspondence between AGM-style belief change and dynamic epistemic logic. In particular, he shows how update rules
can be used to modify the plausibility relation between possible worlds. Van Linder et al. [40] show how one can extend
a propositional modal logic of multiagent knowledge, belief, and action to accommodate belief revision/contraction actions,
following a similar approach to Segerberg’s [35]. They also formalize agents’ ability to perform actions (including having
the required information) and how this applies to belief revision actions. However, they do not discuss how sensing actions
might lead to belief revision. Thielscher [41] introduces a framework for knowledge in the ﬂuent calculus [42]. He introduces
a predicate Knows(F , s) and provides knowledge update axioms to specify the effects of actions on the knowledge of the
agent.
8. Conclusions and future work
We have proposed an account of iterated belief change that integrates into a well-developed theory of action in the
situation calculus [4]. This has some advantages, in that previous work on the underlying theory can be exploited for dealing
with issues such as solving the frame problem, performing automated reasoning about the effects of actions, specifying and
reasoning about complex actions, etc. Our framework supports the introspection of beliefs and ensures that the agent is
aware of when it was mistaken about its beliefs. Our account of iterated belief change differs from previous accounts in
that, for us, the plausibility assignment to situations remains ﬁxed over time. The dynamics of belief derives from the
dynamics of the B modality and of the domain-dependent ﬂuents. We showed that our theory satisﬁes all of the AGM, and
the majority of the KM and DP postulates.
Our approach does have some limitations. In this paper, we have only looked at cases of belief change where the sensors
are accurate, so that the agent only revises its beliefs by sentences that are actually true. It is the case that our successor
state axiom for B ensures that the agent believes the output of its sensor after sensing. Also, our guarded sensed ﬂuent
axioms allow only hard (but context-dependent) constraints to be speciﬁed between the output of the sensor and the
associated ﬂuent; one cannot state that the sensor is only correct with a certain probability. However, we can also use
beliefs to correlate sensor values to the associated ﬂuents instead of guarded sensed ﬂuent axioms. Thus, we could specify
that the agent prefers histories where the sensors agree with the associated ﬂuents more often to histories where they
agree less often. Some of these issues are addressed in [26].
The fact that we never update the plausibility assignment, may suggest that our account has limited expressiveness. But
we maintain that this is not the case. The example of Section 4 shows that we can handle some cases where a plausibility
assignment update seems to be required.
We could extend the framework by having multiple agents that act independently and impart information to each other.
Instead of beliefs changing only through sensing, they would also change as a result of inform actions. Shapiro et al. [43]
provide a framework for belief expansion resulting from the occurrence of inform actions in the situation calculus, which
we would like to generalize to handle belief revision.
Lakemeyer and Levesque [7] incorporate the logic of only knowing into the Scherl and Levesque framework of belief
update and expansion. The traditional belief (and knowledge) operator speciﬁes formulae that are believed (or known)
by the agent, but there could be others. The ‘only knows’ operator is used to describe all that the agent knows, i.e., a
formula that corresponds exactly to the knowledge state of the agent. In future work, we would like to deﬁne an analogous
‘only believes’ operator that could be used to describe exactly what the agent believes in a framework that supports belief
revision as well as belief expansion.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Theorem 14.
{Axioms 1, 6, and 13} | ∀s, s′.B(s′, s)⊃ (∀s′′.B(s′′, s′)≡ B(s′′, s)).
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Now suppose that for some situation S:
M | ∀s′.B(s′, S)⊃ (∀s′′.B(s′′, s′)≡ B(s′′, S)). (A.1)
We need to show that for any action A:
M | ∀s′.B(s′,do(A, S))⊃ (∀s′′.B(s′′, s′)≡ B(s′′,do(A, S))).
Let S ′′1 be a situation such that M | B(S ′′1,do(A, S)). Then, by the successor state axiom for B (Axiom 1), there exists an S ′1
such that:
M | B(S ′1, S
)∧ S ′′1 = do
(
A, S ′1
)∧ (SF(A, S ′1
)≡ SF(A, S)). (A.2)
We need to show that M | ∀s′′.B(s′′, S ′′1) ≡ B(s′′,do(A, S)). We will prove the ⊃ direction; the other case is similar. Suppose
that for some situation S ′′2, M | B(S ′′2, S ′′1). By the successor state axiom for B and (A.2), there exists a situation S ′2, such
that:
M | B(S ′2, S ′1
)∧ S ′′2 = do
(
A, S ′2
)∧ (SF(A, S ′2
)≡ SF(A, S ′1
))
. (A.3)
It follows from (A.1), (A.2), and (A.3) that M | B(S ′2, S). From this, (A.2) and (A.3), and the successor state axiom for B , it
follows that M | B(S ′′2,do(A, S)). 
Lemma 20. Let φ∗ be domain-dependent formula, and A be a revision action for some formula φ . Then,
Σ | ∀s.φ∗[s] ≡ φ∗[do(A, s)].
Proof. By induction on φ∗ . 
Theorem 21. Let φ be a domain-dependent, uniform formula, and A be a revision action for φ wrt Σ . It follows that:
Σ | [∀s.φ[s] ⊃ Bel(φ,do(A, s))]∧ [∀s.¬φ[s] ⊃ Bel(¬φ,do(A, s))].
Proof. We will prove the ﬁrst conjunct; the proof of the second is similar. Let M | Σ and suppose that S and S ′′ are
situations such that M | φ[S] ∧ MPB(S ′′,do(A, S)). By the successor state axiom for B , there is a situation S ′ such that
M | B(S ′, S)∧ S ′′ = do(A, S ′)∧ (SF(A, S ′) ≡ SF(A, S)). Therefore, since M | φ[S] and A is a revision action for φ, M | φ[S ′].
By Lemma 20, M | φ[S ′′]. 
Theorem 22. Let A be a revision action for a domain-dependent, uniform formula φ wrt Σ . The following set of sentences (which we
denote by Γ ) is satisﬁable:
Σ ∪ {Bel(¬φ, S0),Bel
(
φ,do(A, S0)
)
,¬Bel(FALSE,do(A, S0)
)}
.
Proof. Let S1 and S2 be situation constants. Since Σ does not contain initial state axioms, we can construct a model M of
Σ such that:
M | (∀s′.B(s′, S0
)≡ (s′ = S1 ∨ s′ = S2
))∧ ¬φ[S1] ∧ φ[S2] ∧ pl(S1) < pl(S2).
It is easy to verify that M | Γ . 
Theorem 24. Let A be an update action for φ . Then:
Σ | ∀s.Bel(φ,do(A, s)).
Proof. Let M be a model of Σ , and S , S ′′ be situations such that M | MPB(S ′′,do(A, S)). By the successor state axiom for
B , there is a situation S ′ such that M | S ′′ = do(A, S ′). Since A is an update action for φ, M | φ[S ′′]. 
Theorem 25. Let A be a ground action term, and φ , φ′ be uniform formulae. Then:
Σ | ∀s.Bel(φ, s) ∧ ∀s′SF(A, s′)∧ (∀s′.φ[s′]⊃ φ′[do(A, s′)])⊃ Bel(φ′,do(A, s)).
Proof. Let M be a model of Σ and S be a situation such that:
M | Bel(φ, S) ∧ ∀s′SF(A, s′)∧ (∀s′.φ[s′]⊃ φ′[do(A, s′)]). (A.4)
Suppose that for some situation S ′′:
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We need to show that M | φ′[S ′′]. By the successor state axiom for B , there is a situation S ′ such that:
M | B(S ′, S)∧ S ′′ = do(A, S ′). (A.6)
Now, if we could show that M | MP(S ′, S), then the theorem would follow because we could infer from (A.4) that M |
φ[S ′] and also M | φ′[S ′′]. Suppose S ′1 is a situation such that:
M | B(S ′1, S
)
. (A.7)
We need to show that M | pl(S ′) pl(S ′1). It follows from the second conjunct of (A.4), (A.7), and the successor state axiom
for B that M | B(do(A, S ′1),do(A, S)). We can infer from this, (A.5), and (A.6) that M | pl(do(A, S ′)) pl(do(A, S ′1)). This
and the successor state axiom for pl imply M | pl(S ′) pl(S ′1), as desired. 
Theorem 26.
Σ | [Bel(φ, s) ⊃ Bel(Bel(φ), s)]∧ [¬Bel(φ, s) ⊃ Bel(¬Bel(φ), s)].
Proof. This follows directly from Theorem 14. 
Theorem 27. Let A be a revision action for a domain-dependent, uniform formula φ wrt Σ . Then:
Σ | ∀s.Bel(¬φ, s) ∧ Bel(φ,do(A, s))⊃ Bel(Prev(φ ∧ Bel(¬φ)),do(A, s)).
Proof. Let M be a model of Σ and S be a situation such that:
M | Bel(¬φ, S) ∧ Bel(φ,do(A, S)). (A.8)
Suppose for some situation S ′′:
M |MPB(S ′′,do(A, S)). (A.9)
By the successor state axiom for B , there is a situation S ′ such that:
M | B(S ′, S)∧ S ′′ = do(A, S ′). (A.10)
We need to show that M | (φ ∧ Bel(¬φ))[S ′]. It follows from (A.8) and (A.9) that M | φ[S ′′], and from this, (A.10), and
Lemma 20 that M | φ[S ′]. Now, let S ′1 be a situation such that:
M |MPB(S ′1, S ′
)
. (A.11)
It follows from this, (A.10), and Theorem 14 that M | B(S ′1, S). If we could show that M | MP(S ′1, S) then the theorem
would follow since we could infer from (A.8) that M | ¬φ[S ′1]. Let S ′2 be a situation such that M | B(S ′2, S). It follows
from (A.10) and Theorem 14 that M | B(S ′2, S ′). We can now infer from (A.11) that M | pl(S ′1) pl(S ′2). 
Theorem 34.
Σ | ∀sB(s, s).
Proof. By induction on s. 
Theorem 36. For any model M of Σ , the AGM postulates (K∗1)–(K∗8) are satisﬁed, when ∗ is deﬁned as in Deﬁnition 32 for any
situation t and domain-dependent uniform formulae φ and ψ .
We prove this theorem by proving each postulate as a separate lemma.
Lemma 42 (K∗1). Under the assumptions of Theorem 36, K (t ∗ φ) is deductively closed.
Proof. This lemma follows from the fact that the Bel operator is closed over logical entailment. 
Lemma 43 (K∗2). Under the assumptions of Theorem 36, φ ∈ K (t ∗ φ).
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In the following lemma, we show conditions under which a most plausible, accessible situation remains so after a
revision action for φ is performed.
Lemma 44. Let A be a revision action for φ . Then, Σ | ∀s, s′.φ[s] ∧ φ[s′] ∧MPB(s′, s) ⊃MPB(do(A, s′),do(A, s)).
Proof. Let M | Σ and t, t′ be situations such that M | φ[t] ∧ φ[t′] ∧ MPB(t′, t). Since A is a revision action for φ, M |
SF(A, t) ∧ SF(A, t′). Then, M | B(do(A, t′),do(A, t)) follows from the successor state axiom for B . To see that do(A, t′) is
most plausible, let t′′1 be a situation such that M | B(t′′1,do(A, t)). By the successor state axiom for B , there is a situation
t′1 such that M | t′′1 = do(A, t′1). By assumption, M | pl(t′) pl(t′1). By the successor state axiom for pl, M | pl(do(A, t′))
pl(t′′1). 
Lemma 45 (K∗3). Under the assumptions of Theorem 36, K (t ∗ φ) ⊆ t + φ .
Proof. Suppose ψ ∈ K (t ∗ φ), i.e., M | Bel(ψ,do(A, t)). We need to show that M | Bel(φ ⊃ ψ, t). Let t′ be a situ-
ation such that M | MPB(t′, t) ∧ φ[t′]. Since t ∗ φ is deﬁned, M | φ[t], therefore, it follows from Lemma 44 that
M | MPB(do(A, t′),do(A, t)). This, together with the hypothesis, imply that M | ψ[do(A, t′)]. It follows from Lemma 20
that M | ψ[t′]. 
The following lemma identiﬁes conditions under which the predecessor (under a revision action for φ) of a most plausi-
ble and accessible situation is also most plausible and accessible.
Lemma 46. Let A be a revision action for φ . Then,
Σ | ∀s.φ[s] ∧ ¬Bel(¬φ, s) ⊃ [∀s′′.MPB(s′′,do(A, s))⊃ ∃s′.MPB(s′, s)∧ s′′ = do(A, s′)∧ φ[s′]].
Proof. Suppose for some situation t , M | Σ ∧ φ[t] and M | Bel(¬φ, t). Then, for some situation u, M | MPB(u, t) ∧ φ[u].
Further suppose that for some situation t′′ , M | MPB(t′′,do(A, t)). Since M satisﬁes the successor state axiom for B , there
is a situation t′ such that M | B(t′, t) ∧ t′′ = do(A, t′) ∧ SF(A, t′) ≡ SF(A, t). Since A is a revision action for φ, it follows
that M | φ[t′]. It remains to show that M | MP(t′, t). Suppose to the contrary that there is a situation t∗ such that
M | B(t∗, t) ∧ pl(t∗) < pl(t′). Since M | MPB(u, t), it follows that M | pl(u)  pl(t∗), and therefore M | pl(u) < pl(t′).
By the successor state axiom for pl, M | pl(do(A,u)) < pl(t′′). It follows from the assumptions and Lemma 44 that M |
B(do(A,u),do(A, t)), which contradicts M |MPB(t′′,do(A, t)). 
Lemma 47 (K∗4). Under the assumptions of Theorem 36, if ¬φ /∈ K (t) then t + φ ⊆ K (t ∗ φ).
Proof. Suppose ¬φ /∈ K (t), i.e., M | ¬Bel(¬φ, t), and ψ ∈ t + φ, i.e.,
M | Bel(φ ⊃ ψ, t). (A.12)
We need to show that M | Bel(ψ,do(A, t)). Suppose that for some situation t′′ , M |MPB(t′′,do(A, t)). Since t ∗φ is deﬁned,
M | φ[t]. Therefore, by Lemma 46, M | ∃s′.MPB(s′, t)∧ t′′ = do(A, s′)∧φ[s′]. Let t′ be a situation such that M |MPB(t′, t)∧
t′′ = do(A, t′) ∧ φ[t′]. It follows from (A.12) that M | ψ[t′]. By Lemma 20, M | ψ[t′′]. 
Lemma 48 (K∗5). Under the assumptions of Theorem 36, K (t ∗ φ) =Lnow.
Proof. This follows directly from Corollary 35. 
Lemma 49 (K∗6). Under the assumptions of Theorem 36, if | φ ≡ ψ , then K (t ∗ φ) = K (t ∗ ψ).
Proof. This follows from the fact that the Bel operator preserves logical equivalence. 
Lemma 50 (K∗7). Under the assumptions of Theorem 36, K (t ∗ (φ ∧ ψ)) ⊆ (t ∗ φ) + ψ .
Proof. Suppose γ ∈ K (t ∗ (φ ∧ ψ)), i.e.,
M | Bel(γ ,do(Aφ∧ψ, t)
)
. (A.13)
We need to show that γ ∈ (t ∗ φ) + ψ , i.e., M | Bel(ψ ⊃ γ ,do(Aφ, t)). Suppose to the contrary that there is a situation t′′
such that:
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)∧ (ψ ∧ ¬γ )[t′′]. (A.14)
Since t ∗φ is deﬁned, M | φ[t]. Therefore, it follows from the successor state axiom for B and (A.14) that there is a situation
t′ such that:
M | B(t′, t)∧ t′′ = do(Aφ, t′
)∧ φ[t′]. (A.15)
We can infer from Lemma 20, (A.14), and (A.15) that:
M | (ψ ∧ ¬γ )[t′], and thus (A.16)
M | ¬γ [do(Aφ∧ψ, t′
)]
. (A.17)
Now, it remains to show that M | MPB(do(Aφ∧ψ, t′),do(Aφ∧ψ, t)), since this along with (A.17) contradicts (A.13). Since
t ∗ (φ ∧ψ) is deﬁned, M | (φ ∧ψ)[t]. Therefore, the successor state axiom for B together with (A.15) and (A.16) imply that
M | B(do(Aφ∧ψ, t′),do(Aφ∧ψ, t)). Suppose t∗∗ is such that:
M | B(t∗∗,do(Aφ∧ψ, t)
)
. (A.18)
We need to show that M | pl(do(Aφ∧ψ, t′)) pl(t∗∗). Since M | (φ ∧ ψ)[t], it follows from the successor state axiom for B
and (A.18) that there is a situation t∗ such that:
M | B(t∗, t)∧ t∗∗ = do(Aφ∧ψ, t∗
)∧ (φ ∧ ψ)[t∗]. (A.19)
Similarly, it follows from the successor state axiom for B and (A.19) that M | B(do(Aφ, t∗),do(Aφ, t)). From this and (A.14),
we can infer that M | pl(t′′)  pl(do(Aφ, t∗)). We can now use the successor state axiom for pl with (A.15) and (A.19) to
infer that M | pl(do(Aφ∧ψ, t′)) pl(t∗∗) as required. 
Lemma 51 (K∗8). Under the assumptions of Theorem 36, if ¬ψ /∈ K (t ∗ φ), then (t ∗ φ) + ψ ⊆ K (t ∗ φ ∧ ψ).
Proof. Suppose that ¬ψ /∈ K (t ∗ φ), i.e.:
M | ¬Bel(¬ψ,do(Aφ, t)
)
, and (A.20)
for some formula γ , γ ∈ (t ∗ φ) + ψ , i.e.:
M | Bel(ψ ⊃ γ ,do(Aφ, t)
)
. (A.21)
We need to show that γ ∈ K (t ∗ φ ∧ ψ), i.e.:
M | Bel(γ ,do(Aφ∧ψ, t)
)
. (A.22)
Suppose that for some situation t′′:
M |MPB(t′′,do(Aφ∧ψ, t)
)
. (A.23)
We need to show that M | γ [t′′]. Since Aφ∧ψ is a revision action for φ ∧ ψ and t ∗ (φ ∧ ψ) is deﬁned, it follows from the
successor state axiom for B and (A.23) that there is a situation t′ such that:
M | B(t′, t)∧ t′′ = do(Aφ∧ψ, t′
)∧ (φ ∧ ψ)[t′]. (A.24)
We can infer from Lemma 20 that:
M | (φ ∧ ψ)[do(Aφ, t′
)]
. (A.25)
If we can show that M | MPB(do(Aφ, t′),do(Aφ, t)), then by (A.21) and (A.25), M | γ [do(Aφ, t′)], and the theorem follows
from Lemma 20 and (A.24), i.e., M | γ [t′] ∧ γ [t′′]. Since Aφ is a revision action for φ, it follows from (A.24) and the
successor state axiom for B that M | B(do(Aφ, t′),do(Aφ, t)). Now let t∗∗ be a situation such that:
M | B(t∗∗,do(Aφ, t)
)
. (A.26)
It remains to show that pl(do(Aφ, t′)) pl(t∗∗). From (A.20) and (A.26), it follows that there is a situation u′′ such that:
M | B(u′′,do(Aφ, t)
)∧ ψ[u′′]∧ pl(u′′) pl(t∗∗). (A.27)
Since t ∗ φ is deﬁned, M | φ[t]. Therefore, since Aφ is a revision action for φ, it follows from (A.27), the successor state
axiom for B , and Lemma 20 that there is a situation u′ such that:
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)∧ (φ ∧ ψ)[u′]. (A.28)
Since t ∗ (φ ∧ ψ) is deﬁned, M | φ ∧ ψ[t]. Therefore, since Aφ∧ψ is a revision action for φ ∧ ψ , we can apply the successor
state axiom for B again to yield:
M | B(do(Aφ∧ψ,u′
)
,do(Aφ∧ψ, t)
)
.
This together with (A.23) implies that M | pl(t′′)  pl(do(Aφ∧ψ,u′)). Using the successor state axiom for pl along with
(A.24) and (A.28), we obtain M | pl(do(Aφ, t′))  pl(u′′). This, together with (A.27), yields M | pl(do(Aφ, t′))  pl(t∗∗), as
desired. 
Lemma 39. w ∈ [K (t)] iff there exists t′ ∈MPB(t) such that w = Tr(t′).
Proof. The “if” part is obvious. For the “only if” part, we ﬁx w ∈ [K (t)]. Since Lnow is propositional and ﬁnite, let F be the
conjunction of literals in w . Suppose, towards a contradiction, that there is no t′ ∈ MPB(t) such that w = Tr(t′). Then it is
easy to see that M | Bel(¬F , t). Therefore, ¬F ∈ K (t), which implies w /∈ [K (t)]. Contradiction. 
Theorem 40. K (t  φ) satisﬁes KM postulates (K  1), (K  2), (K  4), (K  5), (K  8) when  is deﬁned as in Deﬁnition 37 for any
situation t and consistent domain-dependent uniform formulae φ and ψ .
We prove this theorem by proving each postulate as a separate lemma.
Lemma 52 (K  1). K (t  φ) is closed.
Proof. This lemma follows from the fact that the Bel operator is closed over logical entailment. 
Lemma 53 (K  2). φ ∈ K (t  φ).
Proof. This lemma follows directly from Theorem 24. 
After an update action is performed, the accessible situations are simply projected forward. In particular, as the following
lemma shows, the most plausible accessible situations are preserved.
Lemma 54. Let A be an update action for φ and t be a ground situation term. Then,
Σ | ∀s.MPB(s, t) ≡MPB(do(A, s),do(A, t)).
Proof. This follows from the deﬁnition of an update action and the successor state axioms for B and pl. 
Lemma 55 (K  4). K (t  φ) =Lnow iff K (t) | FALSE.
Proof. This follows from Lemma 54. 
Lemma 56 (K  5). If | φ ≡ ψ , then K (t  φ) = K (t  ψ).
Proof. This follows from the deﬁnition of ua. 
Lemma 57 (K  8). If MPB(t) = ∅ then K (t  φ) =⋂t′∈MPB(t) Tr(t′  φ).
Proof. Let A denote ua(φ). Note that K (t  φ) =⋂t′∈MPB(do(A,t)) Tr(t′) and t′  φ = do(A, t′), therefore we need to show that:
⋂
t′′∈MPB(do(A,t))
Tr
(
t′′
)=
⋂
t′∈MPB(t)
Tr
(
do
(
A, t′
))
.
This follows from Lemma 54. 
Theorem 41. Postulates (DP1), (DP3) and (DP4) are satisﬁed when ∗ is deﬁned as in Deﬁnition 32 for any situation t and domain-
dependent uniform formulae φ and ψ .
We prove this theorem as a series of lemmas.
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Proof. Suppose γ ∈ K ((t ∗ φ) ∗ ψ), i.e.:
M | Bel(γ ,do(Aψ,do(Aφ, t)
))
. (A.29)
We need to show that γ ∈ t ∗ ψ , i.e., M | Bel(γ ,do(Aψ, t)). Let t′′ be a situation such that
M |MPB(t′′,do(Aψ, t)
)
. (A.30)
We need to show that M | γ [t′′]. Since Aψ is a revision action for ψ and t ∗ ψ is deﬁned, by the successor axiom for B ,
there is a situation t′ such that
M | B(t′, t)∧ t′′ = do(Aψ, t′
)∧ ψ[t′]. (A.31)
Also, since ψ | φ, it follows that M | φ[t′]. By Lemma 20 and (A.31), M | ψ[do(Aφ, t′)]. Therefore, we can apply the
successor state axiom for B twice to obtain M | B(do(Aψ,do(Aφ, t′)),do(Aψ,do(Aφ, t))). Now, if it were also the case
that M | MP(do(Aψ,do(Aφ, t′)),do(Aψ,do(Aφ, t))), then the theorem would follow since we could infer from (A.29) that
M | γ [do(Aψ,do(Aφ, t′))], and M | γ [t′′] would follow from this, Lemma 20, and (A.31). Suppose to the contrary that
there is a situation t∗∗∗ such that:
M | B(do(Aψ,do
(
Aφ, t
′)),do
(
Aψ,do(Aφ, t)
))∧ pl(t∗∗∗)< pl(do(Aψ,do
(
Aφ, t
′))). (A.32)
Since Aψ is a revision action for ψ , and (t ∗ φ) ∗ ψ is deﬁned, it follows from the successor state axiom for B that there is
a situation t∗∗ such that:
M | B(do(Aφ, t∗∗
)
,do(Aφ, t)
)∧ t∗∗∗ = do(Aψ, t∗∗
)∧ ψ[t∗∗]. (A.33)
We can infer from this and the successor state axiom for B that there is a situation t∗ such that: M | B(t∗, t) ∧ t∗∗ =
do(Aφ, t∗). It follows from this, (A.33), and Lemma 20 that M | ψ[t∗]. Also, since t ∗ ψ is deﬁned, M | ψ[t]. Therefore,
we can use the successor state axiom for B again to obtain: M | B(do(Aψ, t∗),do(Aψ, t)). We can now see from (A.30)
that M | pl(t′′)  pl(do(Aψ, t∗)). However, it follows from (A.32), the situation equations, and repeated application of the
successor state axiom for pl that: M | pl(do(Aψ, t∗)) < pl(t′′). Contradiction. 
Lemma 59. Under the conditions of Theorem 41, φ ∈ K ((t ∗ φ) ∗ ψ).
Proof. We need to show that M | Bel(φ,do(Aψ,do(Aφ, t))). Let t′′′ be a situation such that:
M |MPB(t′′′,do(Aψ,do(Aφ, t)
))
. (A.34)
Since Aφ is a revision action for φ and t ∗ φ is deﬁned, it follows from two applications of the successor state axiom for B
that there is a situation t′ such that:
M | B(t′, t)∧ t′′′ = do(Aψ,do
(
Aφ, t
′))∧ φ[t′].
It follows from Lemma 20 that M | φ[t′′′]. 
(DP3) follows as a corollary.
Corollary 60 (DP3). Under the conditions of Theorem 41, if φ ∈ K (t ∗ ψ), then φ ∈ K ((t ∗ φ) ∗ ψ).
Lemma 61 (DP4). Under the conditions of Theorem 41, if ¬φ /∈ K (t ∗ ψ), then ¬φ /∈ K ((t ∗ φ) ∗ ψ).
Proof. Suppose that there is a situation t∗∗ such that:
M |MPB(t∗∗,do(Aψ, t)
)∧ φ[t∗∗]. (A.35)
We need to show that there is a situation t+ such that:
M |MPB(t+,do(Aψ,do(Aφ, t)
))∧ φ[t+].
Since Aψ is a revision action for ψ and t ∗ ψ is deﬁned, it follows from the successor state axiom for B , Lemma 20, and
(A.35), there is a t∗ such that:
M | B(t∗, t)∧ t∗∗ = do(Aψ, t∗
)∧ (φ ∧ ψ)[t∗]. (A.36)
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B(do(Aψ,do(Aφ, t∗)),do(Aψ,do(Aφ, t))). Now, if we can show that M |MP(do(Aψ,do(Aφ, t∗)),do(Aψ,do(Aφ, t))), then the
theorem would follow because Lemma 20 implies that:
M | φ[t∗]≡ φ[do(Aψ,do
(
Aφ, t
∗))],
and M | φ[do(Aψ,do(Aφ, t∗))] follows from this and (A.36). Let t′′′ be a situation such that:
M | B(t′′′,do(Aψ,do(Aφ, t)
))
. (A.37)
We need to show that M | pl(do(Aψ,do(Aφ, t∗))) pl(t′′′). It follows from the successor state axiom for B , Lemma 20, and
(A.37) that there is a situation t′ such that:
M | B(t′, t)∧ t′′′ = do(Aψ,do
(
Aφ, t
′))∧ ψ[t′]. (A.38)
We can use the successor state axiom for B again to yield:
M | B(do(Aψ, t′
)
,do(Aψ, t)
)
.
From this and (A.35), it follows that M | pl(t∗∗) pl(do(Aψ, t′)). Using (A.36), (A.38), and the successor state axiom for pl,
we can infer that M | pl(do(Aψ,do(Aφ, t∗))) t′′′ , as desired. 
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